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RAPE - UNCONSCIOUS VICTIM - The Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania held that a victim is "unconscious" under 18 Pa.
Cons. Stat. section 3121(3) even if the victim can remember some
details of the rape.
CRIMINAL LAW -

Commonwealth v. Erney, 698 A.2d 56 (Pa. 1997).
On a December evening in 1991, fifteen-year-old J.R. went with
her friend Timothy Beck ("Beck"), to the home of the appellant,
Roland Erney ("Erney"). 1 Another friend of Erney's, Duane Weiser
("Weiser"), was also present when J.R. and Beck arrived.2 During
their visit, Erney gave J.R. and Beck alcohol and marijuana. 3 Erney
aggressively encouraged J.R. to smoke the marijuana by pressuring
her to take repeated "hits" from the cigarette and she soon became
highly intoxicated. 4 Beck stated that J.R. was "incoherent, 'not
paying attention to anything that was going on around her,' and
like 'a vegetable.'-5 It was at this point, as J.R. was lying on the
floor in this "incoherent" state, that the bedroom light was turned
6
off, and both Erney and Duane Weiser began fondling J.R.
Although Beck informed Erney of J.R's age, Erney tore down J.R's
pants and had sexual intercourse with her.' At trial, J.R. testified
1. Commonwealth v. Erney, 698 A.2d 56 (Pa. 1997). Roland Erney was thirty-three
years old at the time of the incident and lived with his mother at her home on Bethlehem
Pike in Sellersville, Bucks County, Pennsylvania. Brief for Appellee at 4, Commonwealth v.
Erney, 698 A.2d 56 (Pa 1997) No. 45 E.D. 1996; Erney, 698 A.2d at 58.
2. Erney, 698 &2d at 58. Erney's mother was asleep in her bedroom during the
incident Id.
3. Id. J.R. stated that they went to Erney's home because they wanted to get "high" and
drunk. Brief for Appellee at 4. J.R. testified that she smoked approximately three or four
bowls of marijuana and drank some type of alcoholic beverage. Id. J.R. stated that at this
time she felt "messed up." Id. Beck, J.R., Emey, and Weiser then went up to Erney's
bedroom where they continued to smoke marijuana Id.
4. Id. Several times Erney refused to allow J.R. to "pass the joint," making her
consume consecutive doses of marijuana. Id. J.R. testified at trial that she felt even "more
messed up" afterwards and that she could not move. Brief for Appellee at 5.
5. Id. J.R was so intoxicated by the marijuana and alcohol that she could not move or
speak. Id.
6. Commonwealth v. Erney, No. 5440, 1992 (C.P. Bucks County Criminal Division)
(Order denying post-trial motions). J.R. testified that both men touched her breasts and
digitally penetrated her. Brief for Appellee at 5. J.R. described feeling as though she couldn't
get up or move. Id. She said that she told both men to stop, but they ignored her requests.
Id.

7. Erney, 698 A.2d at 58. Erney assaulted J.R. while Beck was still present in the room.
Id. Beck testified that he told Erney that J.R. was only fifteen years old, to which Erney
replied that J.R. reminded him of his fifteen-year-old daughter. Id. Beck never physically
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that she attempted several times to tell Erney to stop in her loudest
voice. 8 According to Beck, J.R. only mumbled unintelligibly and
was unable to answer when he tried to question her to see if she
was "okay."9 J.R. testified that she had no idea how long the assault
lasted or why the assault stopped.' 0 J.R. could not remember
getting dressed or leaving Erney's home."
The next day, J.R. was unsure whether the assault actually
happened, but she confirmed the events with Beck.' 2 J.R. also
spoke with Erney on the telephone - he told J.R. that "she had
gotten what she deserved."' 3 J.R. reported the assault to the police
in August 1992.' 4 When the police questioned Erney, he initially
admitted that J.R. had been in his home and that they smoked
15
marijuana, but later denied that J.R. was ever there.
The Pennridge Regional Police Department arrested and charged
Erney with the rape of an unconscious victim,' 6 aggravated
indecent assault,' 7 and corruption of minors.'8 On March 9, 1993, a
tried to intervene in the assault, but was able to stop Erney's attack on J.R. through repeated
pleas and threats of calling the police and waking Erney's mother. Id. J.R. testified that her
pants were ripped during the assault and that she was aware that Erney got on top of her,
penetrated her, and moved around. Appellee's Brief at 5.
8. Id.
9. Id. Beck questioned J.R. during the assault to try to determine if she was alright.
Id.
10. Id. J.R. testified that Erney simply stopped the assault. Id. In reality, Beck
threatened to wake Erney's mother, who was asleep in another bedroom, and call the police.
Id. Erney still did not cease until Beck started to leave the room to call for help. Id.
11. Id. J.R. was unable to walk down the stairs in Erney's home, so she slid down
them and rested before being able to leave with Beck. Id.
12. Erney, 698 A.2d at 58.
13. Id. Erney later called J.R.'s mother and told her that J.R. got "what she deserved
because women are evil and [they] all get what [they] deserve." Id.
14. Brief for Appellee at 6.
15. Erney, 698 A.2d at 58. Emey claimed no females other than family had been to his
house in over two years. Id.
16. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. section 3121(3) provides, in part: "a person commits a
felony of the first degree when he or she engages in sexual intercourse with a complainant
. . .who is unconscious or where the person knows that the complainant is unaware that
the sexual intercourse is occuring." Id.
17. 18 PA_ CONS. STAT. ANN. section 3125 provides, in part:
[E]xcept as provided in [§]3121 (relating to rape), 3122.1 (relating to statutory sexual
assault), 3123 (relating to involuntary deviate sexual intercourse) and 3124.1 (relating
to sexual assault), a person who engages in penetration, however slight, of the
genitals or anus of a complainant with a part of the person's body for any purpose
other than good faith medical, hygienic, or law enforcement procedures commits
aggravated indecent assault, a felony of the second degree, if... the complainant is
unconscious or the person knows that the complainant is unaware that penetration is
occuring; . . .
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jury in Bucks County convicted Erney on all three counts. 9 Erney
filed post-trial motions alleging that the court violated his rights
under the Sixth and Fourteenth amendments to the United States
Constitution by quashing his subpoena of records maintained by
the Network of Victim Assistance ("NOVA"). 20 He further claimed
that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict under 18
Pa. Cons. Stat. section 3121(3).21 The court denied his motions on
August 31, 1993 and sentenced Erney on January 13, 199522 to a
mandatory term of five to ten years in prison.2 Erney appealed his
conviction to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.2 No longer
denying he had sex with J.R., Erney contended that because his
victim could remember parts of the assault in detail, she was
conscious and was, therefore, not an "unconscious victim" under 18
Pa. Cons. Stat. section 3121(3).25 Under this interpretation, Erney
argued there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction
under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. section 3121(3).26 The superior court
affirmed the conviction, finding that the testimony that J.R. was
"messed up," "stoned," and "out of it" was sufficient to establish the
victim's unconscious state within the meaning intended by the
legislature and the Webster's New World Dictionary's definition of
"unconscious."27 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted
18. Erney, 698 A.2d at 56. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. section 6301 provides: "whoever,
being of the age of 18 years and upwards, by any act corrupts or tends to corrupt the morals
of any minor less than 18 years of age. . ." may be charged with corruption of a minor. Id.
Erney was charged on October 2, 1992 by Officer Donald C. Fresh of the Pennridge Regional
Police Department. Brief for Appellee at 3. Erney's preliminary hearing was held on October
19, 1992 before District Justice C. Robert Roth. Id.
19. Erney, 698 A.2d at 56. The convictions were for the sexual assault of a teenage girl
who was so intoxicated she could not consent and was unaware of parts of the assault. Id,
The jury found Erney not guilty of rape by forcible compulsion, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. section
3121(1). Brief for Appellee at 3. The trial commenced on March 8, 1993 before the Honorable
Edward G. Biester, Jr. Id.
20. Brief for Appellee at 3.
21. Id.
22. Id. Erney's sentencing was scheduled for October 1, 1993 but Erney, who had a
history of mental illness, was found to be incompetent. Id. He was deemed competent again
on January 13, 1995 and consequently sentenced. Id.
23. Id. See also Sentences for Offenses Against Infant Persons, 42 PA CoNs. STAT. ANN.
§ 9718; mandatory sentencing guidelines relating to the rape of person under 16 years old.
Id.
24. Erney, 698 A.2d at 56.
25. Id. J.R. was able to remember that Erney touched her vagina and penetrated her
with his penis. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.; Brief for Appellant at 9; Commonwealth v. Emey, 698 A.2d 56 (Pa. 1997) (No.
45 E.D.).
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allocator.2s
The sole issue before the supreme court was whether a victim is
"unconscious" within the meaning of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. section
3121(3) when the victim is able to remember, in detail, some parts
of the assault, but is too intoxicated to communicate "no" to her
attacker, even though she believed she did so loudly.29 The court
held that a victim who is intermittently unconscious throughout the
assault is so impaired physically and mentally that she is incapable
of giving consent and, therefore, intercourse with such a victim is
rape. 30 In considering the sufficiency of the evidence claim, the
court relied upon the standard of review articulated in
Commonwealth v. Bracey and found that there was sufficient
evidence for the jury to find that the victim was unconscious
31
during parts of the sexual assault.
In rejecting Erney's claim that the victim was not unconscious
because she could recollect some of the events that occurred
during the assault, the court relied upon the common and approved
usage of the term "unconscious."3 The court defined "unconscious"
as lacking knowledge or awareness of one's own sensations or
external events; not being in a normal waking state. 33 When the
assault began, the victim, J.R., showed no signs of awareness of
external events and was unaware that she was not communicating
"no" to her attacker 4 J.R. was only able to remember portions of
the assault and had no knowledge of when or why the assault
28. Id. "Allocatur" is a term used to denote that a writ or order was accepted for
review. BLACK'S LAW DIcTIoNARY 49 (6th ed. 1990).
29. Erney, 698 A.2d at 58. The victim's mistaken belief that she communicated "no" to
her attacker is relevant to the issue of her impaired mental condition and her awareness of
the events taking place around her. Id. at 59. J.R.'s lack of awareness contradicts Erney's
argument that J.R. was conscious and aware of the assault and, therefore, not an
.unconscious victim." Id. at 58.
30. Id. at 59. The court concluded that if a mentally and physically impaired victim
lacks the capacity to consent, her submission to intercourse is involuntary. Id. The court
found this constitutes "rape of an unconscious victim." Id. J.R. was so physically impaired
that she had to be held up during the assault. Brief for Appellee at 13.
31. Erney, 698 A.2d at 58. The standard established by the court in Commonwealth v.
Bracey, A.2d 1062 (Pa.1995), is that the court must "view the evidence most favorable to the
Commonwealth as verdict winner and accept as true all evidence and reasonable inferences
arising therefrom upon which, if believed, the jury could have based their verdict." Id.
32. Erney, 698 A-2d at 58, 59.
33. Id. The court relied upon Webster's New World Dictionary (2d College ed.) and
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (9th ed.). Id. "Unconscious" is defined as "not endowed

with consciousness" and "consciousness" is defined as "the awareness of one's own feelings,
what is happening around one . . ." Id. "Consciousness" is further defined as "aware;
cognizant.. . [;] able to feel and think; in the normal waking state.. . " Id.
34. Id. at 58.
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stopped. 35 Both Beck and Weiser testified at trial that the victim
was just lying on the floor "out of it" and "spaced out," not
perceiving any of the events that were going on around her.3 6 The
court found that this was ample evidence that J.R. was not in a
normal waking state during the assault and was, therefore,
"unconscious" under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. section 3121(3). 37
The court further denied Erney's contention that 18 Pa. Cons.
Stat. section 3121(3) only protects individuals who are completely
unconscious throughout the assault.38 Rather, the court determined
that because of J.R.'s impaired mental and physical condition, she
could not have voluntarily consented to intercourse with Erney.3 9
J.R. was unable to respond to Beck's inquiries as to whether she
wanted to have sex with Erney and was not even able to move. 40
The court reasoned that allowing Erney to escape punishment
because his victim was conscious during part of the assault would
be inconsistent with the intent of the legislature to punish sexual
intercourse with one who is unable, physically or mentally, to
consent.41 The court affirmed the order of the superior court,
upholding Erney's conviction for rape under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat.
section 3121(3).
Justice Nigro wrote a dissenting opinion stating that there was
insufficient evidence that the victim in this case was
"unconscious."42 Justice Nigro stated that the victim's ability to
recall details of the assault and her awareness that the assault
stopped showed that she was in fact conscious, and therefore, not
an "unconscious victim."43 He further noted that one's inability to
consent because of intoxication does not support a conviction for
rape under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. section 3121. 44 Justice Nigro
35. 1d.
36. Brief for Appellee at 13, 14. Weiser was a witness for the defense. Id. at 14. He
testified that J.R. was unaware of Erney's search for a condom and his talk of having sex
with her. Id, Weiser stated that both he and Beck tried to get Erney to stop by saying "no,"
but that J.R. "didn't even say a word." Id.
37. Erney, 694 A.2d at 59.
38. Id. "In considering the legislative intent, we are mindful that the 'essence of the
criminal act of rape is involuntary submission to sexual intercourse.'" Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. Brief for Appellee at 13.
41. Id. at 31.
42. Erney, 698 A.2d at 59 (Nigro, J., dissenting). Justice Zappala joined Justice Nigro in
dissent. Id.
43. Id. Even though the victim was unaware of the "nature of the assault ..
she was
cognizant that the assault stopped." Id
44. Id. at 60.
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differentiated between "one who is inebriated and one who is
unconscious" and urged the legislature to enact a means to convict
45
in situations involving the rape of an intoxicated victim.
"Rape" in England was defined by Chief Justice Matthew Hale of
the King's Bench as "the carnal knowledge of any woman above the
age of ten years against her will."4 Under English law, a rape
victim, like the victims of other crimes, was required to "raise a
hue" and cry out to warn the rest of the community.47 The woman
was then expected to initiate legal action by bringing her bleeding
body to authorities and exhibiting her torn clothing.48 In 1275,
Parliament enacted the Statute of Westminster to allow the Crown
to bring charges against the offenders if the woman failed to press
charges within forty days.4 9 Until 1840, the punishment for rape in
England was death.5°
American common law borrowed the English definition of rape,
defining it as "unlawful carnal knowledge of a woman, forcibly and
against her will. "5 1 Rape was not defined by statute in Pennsylvania
until passage of the Criminal Code of 1860, which specifically
embodied the common law definition. 52 Prior Pennsylvania statutes
only listed rape as a felony and adopted the English statutory
definition of rape that provided, "if a man from henceforth do
ravish a woman married, maid, or other, where she did not
consent, neither before nor after, he shall have judgement of life
and member."5
45. Id. Justice Nigro did not doubt that an intoxicated victim could be raped, only that
an intoxicated victim who was only partially unaware of the events surrounding her and
otherwise awake and cognizant, was not sufficiently "unconscious" to support a rape
conviction under section 3121(3). Id.
46. KErH BURGESS-JACKSON, RAPE: A PLOSOPiCAL INVESTIGATION 70 (1996).
47. Id.
48.

JENNIFER TEMKIN, RAPE AND THE CREMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 177 (1995).

49. Id.
50. BURGESS-JACKSON, supra note 45, at 70. "[Tlhe Statute of Westminster mitigated this
to two years imprisonment and a fine at the King's pleasure," but this statute only was valid
for ten years, after which rape was again considered a capital offense. Id.
51.

JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRMNAL LAw 531 (2d ed. 1995). The common law

definition was taken from 2 SHARSWOOD's BLAcKsroNE'S COMMENTARY 209. Id.
52. Commonwealth v. Stephens, 17 A.2d 919, 920 (Pa 1941). Act of March 31, 1860
Pub. L. No. 382 § 91, as amended by the Act of May 19, 1887 Pub. L. No. 128 § 1, 18 Pa
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2261. Id.
53. Stephens, 17 A.2d at 920. The English statute in force was 13 Ed. I, STAT. WESTM. 2,
c. 34 (1285). Id. The court in Stephens discussed that the "against her will" requirement in
the Code of 1860 was synonymous with the "without her consent" provision under the
Statute of Westminster. Id.
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Although a provision for an "unconscious victim " 14 was not
included in the rape statute until 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. section
3121 was enacted in 1972, the courts had already been active in
protecting a victim who is unable to give consent because of
unconsciousness. 55 In 1875, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
decided Stevick v. Commonwealth,56 the case of a thirteen-year-old
girl who was raped by a stranger who passed her on the road. 57 In
determining whether a thirteen-year-old girl was capable of
consenting, the court stated that intercourse with a woman who
was "insensible or unconscious, from whatever cause, is rape."o
Commonwealth v. Stephens,59 decided in 1941, involved the rape
of a woman who was insane.60 The court, finding that an insane
woman is incapable of giving consent, stated that "intercourse is
against a woman's will when, from any cause, she is not in a
position to exercise any judgement about the matter."61 Therefore,
the court upheld the appellant's conviction for rape, stating that sex
with a woman who is "mentally unconscious from the use of drugs
or other causes ... is generally held to be rape."62 The court based
its decision on several English cases 63 which relaxed the rule that
force was necessary to prove rape, and determined that "where the
54. The Model Penal Code, drafted in 1955 by the American Law Institute and
published in 1962, contained a provision regarding an unconscious female. BURGESS-JACKSON,
supra note 45, at 72.
55. 1972, Dec. 6, Pub. L. 1482, No. 334, § 1, effective June 6, 1973. Prior laws in section
721 of Penal Code of 1939 (18 P.S. § 4721), as amended by Act No. 1, Special Session No. 3,
of 1966, approved May 12, 1966 defined "statutory rape" as carnal knowledge of a "woman
child" under the age of sixteen years. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121.
56. 78 Pa. 460, 462 (1875).
57. Stevick, 78 Pa. at 462. The girl, Clara, was walking home from her aunt's home
when the appellant approached her, offered her fifty cents to "take liberties with her," and
when she refused, threw her to the ground and threatened to shoot her if she resisted. Id.
Appellant was interrupted in his assault before penetration could occur by another man who
was passing by on the road. Id. The appellant ran and hid in a nearby graveyard. Id.
58. Id. The court decided that Clara did not give her consent and any attempt to cry
out or struggle on her part was stifled by the appellant with threats that he would shoot her.
Id.
59. Stephens, 17 A.2d at 919.
60. Id. The appellant in this case was aware of the girl's insanity because her father
had told him "that girl crazy" and there was medical testimony that any adult could
recognize that the woman was insane and incapable of giving consent. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 920, 921. The court held that the applicable rule is "carnal knowledge of a
woman who is incapable through unsoundness of mind, whether temporary or permanent, of
giving rational legal consent is against her will, and is rape where the actor knows of such
incompetency." Id. at 921.
63. Reg. v. Camplin, 1 Cox C.C. 220; Reg. v. Dee, 15 Cox C.C. 579; Reg. v. Fletcher, 8
Cox C.C. 134.
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female was an idiot, or had been rendered insensible by the use of
drugs or intoxicating drinks, . . . the law implied force."3
After the enactment of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. section 3121 in 1972,
the courts began exploring the issue of what constitutes an
"unconscious" victim within the meaning of the statute.6 In 1992,
Commonwealth v. Price66 addressed the issue of whether a person
who was asleep when intercourse occurred fit within the definition
of "unconscious victim." 67 The superior court held that sexual
intercourse with a person who was asleep was sufficient to support
a finding that defendant committed rape of an unconscious person
under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. section 3121(3).6 In Price,the victim, J.L.,
had been out drinking and dancing with her attacker, Price. 69 When
Price drove J.L. home, he told her he was too intoxicated to drive
and J.L. invited him to sleep on her sofa. 70 J.L. made herself a
snack, went to her bedroom, and soon fell asleep. 71 J.L. awoke not
long afterward to find Price lying on top of her and having
intercourse with her.72 J.L. screamed and pushed Price away.73 The
court found that because J.L. was asleep when the intercourse
occurred she was, therefore, "unconscious" within the meaning of
section 3121(3). 74
Price was the first case to interpret the meaning of
64. Reg. v. Dee, supra note 54.
65. 18 PA- CONS. STAT. section 3121(3) enacted in 1972 provided that "a person commits
a felony of the first degree when he or she engages in sexual intercourse with another
person not his spouse... who is unconscious...." Id.
66. 616 A.2d 681 (1992).
67. Id. The victim in this case also had consumed alcohol, but was asleep when the
assault took place. Id.
68. Price, 616 A.2d at 683. The court distinguished this case from an earlier case,
Comnonwealth v. Titus, 556 A.2d 425 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) in which the intoxicated
defendant climbed into bed with his thirteen-year-old daughter and had sex with her. Id. The
court found it compelling that in Titus, the girl was asleep when the defendant got in bed,
but she was awake when the actual penetration occurred. Id. Also important to the court
was that, in Price, the victim resisted as soon as she awoke, but, in Titus, the victim did not
resist until after intercourse had occurred. Id.
69. Id. at 682.
70. Id. It was approximately 4:00 am. when they returned to J.L.'s home and even
though Price had driven them there, he protested until J.L agreed to let him stay on her
couch. Id. J.L pointed out the sofa as soon as they were inside. Id.
71. Id. J.L ate her snack in her room and telephoned a friend before falling asleep. Id.
72. Id.
73. Price, 616 A.2d at 681. J.L. eventually managed to kick Price out of her apartment
and reported the assault to police the next morning. Id.
74. Id. at 684. The court reasoned that a person who is asleep is unaware of her
surroundings and unable to protect herself against personal intrusion. Id. The court relied
upon the definition of unconscious provided in Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (9th
ed.). Id.
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"unconscious" under section 3121(3), relying upon the dictionary
definition of "unconscious" and the intent of the legislature in
reaching its conclusion that subsection 3 was "enacted to proscribe
intercourse with persons unable to consent because of their
physical condition." 75 The interpretation of "unconscious" made by
the Price court was subsequently upheld in Commonwealth v.
Widmer.76 Widmer also involved a sleeping victim who awoke to7
find her attacker on top of her engaging in sexual intercourse.
The court affirmed the conviction under section 3121(3), relying on
Price for the rule that a sleeping victim who awakens to find a
defendant having sex with her is "unconscious" within the meaning
of section 3121(3). 78
The Pennsylvania legislature amended section 3121(3) in 1995 to
its current form. This section provides: "A person commits a felony
of the first degree when he or she engages in sexual intercourse
with a complainant . .. who is unconscious or where the person
knows the complainant is unaware that the sexual intercourse is
occurring.. .. 79
Although the decision in Commonwealth v. Erney demonstrates
the court's increasing concern for protecting the rape victim, one
may nevertheless question whether the court has gone too far. As
Justice Nigro pointed out in his dissent, the victim was clearly
conscious in this case.80 According to the definition relied upon by
the Erney majority, "consciousness" is "awareness of one's own
75. Id. The court paralleled this holding with its holding in Commonwealth v. Carter,
418 A.2d 537 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980), in which it found that the legislative purpose behind the
enactment of subsection (d) of the rape statute dealing with rape of a mentally deficient
person was to protect persons unable to consent to sexual intercourse. Price, 616 A.2d at
684.
76. 667 A.2d 215 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995), rev. on other grounds, 689 A.2d 211 (Pa. 1997).
77. Widner, 667 A.2d at 219. Widmer had been drinking with the victim's boyfriend. Id.
They returned to the boyfriend's house, where the victim was asleep in an upstairs bedroon.
Id. The victim's boyfriend went looking for Widmer who, while supposedly using the
bathroom, was having sex with the victim. Id. The boyfriend testified that the victim was
beating Widmer on the chest in an attempt to get him to cease his assault. Id. The boyfriend
chased Widmer out of the house with a handgun. Id.
78. Widmer, 667 A.2d at 215.
79. 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 3121. In addition, the 1995 amendment rewrote subsection
4 to provide: "Where the person has substantially impaired the complainant's power to
appraise or control his or her conduct by administering or employing, without the knowledge
of the complainant, drugs, intoxicants or other means for the purpose of preventing
resistance." Id. The amendment also added subsections 5 and 6, which provide "Who suffers
from a mental disability which renders the complainant incapable of consent" and "Who is
less than 13 years of age," respectively. Id.
80. Commonwealth v. Erney, 698 A.2d 56, 59 (Pa. 1997) (Nigro. J., dissenting).
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feelings, what is happening around one."8 1 The victim, J.R., knew
that she was being assaulted because she testified that she thought
she cried out "no."82 If the courts allow an exception for a person
who is highly intoxicated from marijuana and beer, but still
"conscious" within the dictionary definition,8 will they next
consider a person who has consumed three or four beers
"unconscious" or "not in the normal waking state?"8
In addition, this decision may be susceptible to a constitutional
challenge. The court seems to be shifting the burden of proving the
victim's consciousness to the defendant. The courts have been
given considerable latitude in construing what constitutes an
"unconscious victim." If the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
continues to consider an intoxicated, but awake, victim as
"unconscious," the court is forcing the defendant to prove the
victim's awareness of what was occurring and capacity to voice her
objection to the defendant's advances.
The situation presented in Erney is likely to arise again. The
court's decision adds confusion to the already difficult task of
protecting an intoxicated victim. Justice Nigro is correct in his
assertion that the legislature needs to address the issue of the
victim who voluntarily begins drinking, but is either coerced to
imbibe unsafe amounts of the intoxicant(s) or is simply too young
to exercise proper judgement and subsequently is taken advantage
of by an adult.8 The court's decision in Erney offers more
protection to the victim, but further obfuscates the meaning of
"unaware," "not in the normal waking state," and "unconscious"
within the language of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. section 3121(3) for both
defendants and prosecutors.
Melissa A. Struzzi

81. Erney, 698 k2d at 59 (Nigro, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 58.
83. Id. at 59.
84. Id. It is possible to argue that a person after only one beer is no longer in the
"normal waking state." Id.
85. Id. at 60. Section 3121(4) provides: "a person commits a felony of the first degree
when he or she engages in sexual intercourse with a complainant. . . where the person has
substantially impaired the complainant's power to appraise or control his or her conduct by
administering or employing, without the knowledge of the complainant, drugs, intoxicants or
other means for the purpose of preventing resistance. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121(4)
(1995).

